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Quality, above all.

Penetration Test Report

Civilized Discourse Construction Kit, Inc.

External Network and Web Application

August 14, 2026

Contents

Section 1

Executive Summary

Prepared For

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Executive Summary

Civilized Discourse Construction Kit, Inc. ("Discourse") contracted with Schellman Compliance, LLC ("Schellman") to perform a penetration test of the Discourse platform and external network. Testing occurred within the production environment between August 3, 2026, and August 14, 2026. This assessment focused on testing the effectiveness of controls implemented to secure the Discourse environment by identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities, validating their risk, and providing recommendations for remediation.

The following tests were conducted during this engagement:

- External Network Penetration Testing
- Web Application Penetration Testing

No issues were found during this assessment.

Assumptions & Limitations

The assessment was performed taking the following assumptions and limitations into consideration:

- All testing activities were conducted as a point-in-time assessment. As such, the vulnerabilities reflected in this report may not indicate vulnerabilities that existed before or after the test execution window.
- Due to the large number of available integrations and plugins, a sample of integrations were tested during the assessment, with a focus on newly implemented, upcoming integrations.

Section 2

Assessment Scope



Assessment Scope

Prior to any testing activities, Discourse provided a list of URLs, hostnames, IP ranges, IP addresses, and Amazon S3 buckets as the scope of the assessment. Port scanning was performed on all TCP ports and the top 1,000 UDP ports. Schellman conducted testing of only the in-scope resources as defined below.

External Network

A list of the external network scope along with any discovered open ports can be found in Supplement A - 2026_Discourse_External_Open_Ports.xlsx (Link: https://auditsource2.schellman.com/engagements/68824/documents?file=a47a15b0-c1a3-443a-8e8f-b391eb80d2e0).

Web Application

Schellman was provided access to two (2) web applications, which were accessible from the following URLs:

Web Application	URL	Open Ports
Discourse (Tenant A)	https://enduring-creature.blueschell.com	80, 443 TCP
Discourse (Tenant B)	https://depraved-cofounder.redschell.com	80, 443 TCP
Discourse ID	https://id.discourse.com	80, 443 TCP

Web applications and open ports

Assessed Integrations

Schellman was provided with a list of application sources to assess. A sample of eight (8) was chosen, with emphasis placed on newer integrations and those of a sensitive security nature:

Ads	AI	Assign
Data Explorer	Discourse ID	SAML
Subdomain Manager	Zendesk	

Assessed Integrations

Web Application Credentials

Discourse created two (2) initial test accounts to access the applications. Schellman provisioned seven (7) additional user accounts to assess the application in the context of user-defined roles. The table below lists the accounts used during testing, which can be deactivated once all retesting is complete:

Application	Account Name	Role	Created By
Tenant A	alpha.discourse@redschell.com	Administrator	Discourse
Tenant A	user2.discourse@redschell.com	Standard User	Schellman
Tenant B	bravo.discourse@blueschell.com	Administrator	Discourse
Tenant B	delta.discourse@blueschell.com	Standard User	Schellman
Tenant B	echo.discourse@blueschell.com	Standard User	Schellman
Tenant B	alpha.discourse.id@redschell.com	Standard User	Schellman
Tenant B	bravo.discourse.id@redschell.com	Standard User	Schellman
Discourse ID	alpha.discourse.id@redschell.com	Standard User	Schellman
Discourse ID	bravo.discourse.id@redschell.com	Standard User	Schellman

Accounts used during testing

Section 3

Methodology



Methodology

Schellman's approach to penetration testing is based on the experience of a team that has been conducting tests and evaluating their results for over two decades. Schellman understands how breaches occur, how corporate requirements may affect a test, and the need for a quality deliverable which is applicable to executive, security, and system administration teams. Based on this information, a framework was built to ensure the goals and objectives of a quality assessment. The framework leverages the standards available in the public domain, including, but not limited to:

- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-115
- Open Worldwide Application Security Project® (OWASP®) Web Security Testing Guide (WSTG)
- Open Worldwide Application Security Project® (OWASP®) Top 10 for Large Language Model (LLM) Applications
- The MITRE Corporation ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise

External Network

A list of publicly accessible hosts was provided by Discourse. With that information, the following steps were performed from the perspective of an unauthenticated adversary on the Internet.

- ✓ Enumerate open services on all in-scope hosts
- ✓ Perform automated vulnerability scans
- ✓ Manually review each service for known vulnerabilities and security misconfigurations
- ✓ Verify and exploit found vulnerabilities
- ✓ Attempt to escalate privileges and compromise the supporting infrastructure

Web Application

As an authenticated adversary of each application, Schellman attempted to gain access to the servers and infrastructure supporting the environment. Multiple sets of credentials were provided to test the web application attack vectors. The following steps were taken while attempting to breach each web application's protections and access the underlying infrastructure.

- ✓ Configure a local proxy to intercept HTTP(S) traffic
- ✓ Determine the target application footprint
- ✓ Map available web application functionality
- ✓ Analyze client-side code (e.g. HTML and JavaScript) for potential attack vectors
- ✓ Manually search for and exploit vulnerabilities in the OWASP WSTG
- ✓ Attempt to compromise the environment supporting the application

Section 4

Assessment Results



Attack Path Narrative

The following narrative details the major components of Schellman's attack path in pursuit of testing objectives. This attack path is not inclusive of all testing activities, but instead serves to summarize the primary steps taken to complete the assessment.

External Network

Discourse provided in-scope hosts which can be found in Supplement A - 2026_Discourse_External_Open_Ports.xlsx (Link: https://auditsource2.schellman.com/engagements/68824/documents?file=a47a15b0-c1a3-443a-8e8f-b391eb80d2e0). Testing began with passive reconnaissance intended to surface hosts, services, or information exposed to the Internet that could present a risk of disclosure or compromise to the organization. Public sources, including Shodan and crt.sh, were queried to expand the known attack surface. The subdomains recovered through this process had already been accounted for within the scoped list, indicating that the provided scope likely reflected the externally reachable footprint.

Active testing followed, beginning with live host identification across the provided ranges and addresses. Responsive hosts were then scanned across the full range of TCP ports and the top 1,000 UDP ports to establish the exposed service surface. Four (4) open ports were identified (22, 25, 53 and 80 TCP), representing SSH, SMTP, DNS & HTTP(S). The limited number of exposed services narrowed the available attack surface and directed subsequent testing toward the web, mail, and name resolution services identified during discovery.

Once discovery scans were complete, the HTTP services were enumerated for accessible pages, unreferenced content, and functionality reachable without authentication. Several pages that were unauthenticated utilized background scripts; review of their contents did not reveal sensitive information, embedded credentials, or administrative functionality. Attention then shifted to the in-scope S3 buckets, each of which was requested without credentials to determine whether object listing or object retrieval had been inadvertently exposed. Access was denied in each instance. To determine whether sensitive material had been committed to publicly accessible source code, TruffleHog was leveraged against Discourse's public GitHub repository with the intent of uncovering API keys, tokens, or other secrets meant for internal use. The results flagged by the tool were manually validated and determined to be false positives consisting of placeholder values used by application dependencies for unit testing.



False positive identified by TruffleHog

Vulnerability scans were subsequently conducted against the in-scope hosts, and the identified services were examined through a combination of automated and manual enumeration. DNS services were reachable externally, zone transfers were attempted against the hosts presenting port 53 UDP, supplemented by direct interaction with the service to elicit additional records; neither approach returned zone data. The SMTP services presented on port 25 TCP were then evaluated for open relay behavior by attempting to send messages to external recipients without authentication. These attempts were rejected, with the service returning a "Relay access denied" error and terminating the transaction. No issues were identified during this phase of testing.

```
root@ip-10-0-1-164:2026-08-14 23:18:19 UTC:manual-port-checks# nc 184.105.99.121 25
220 ESMTP server
HELO mx-out-01a.sea3.discourse.cloud,
250 mx-out-01a.sea3.discourse.cloud
MAIL FROM: <admin@discourse.cloud>
250 2.1.0 Ok
RCPT TO: <nobody@redschell.com>
454 4.7.1 <nobody@redschell.com>: Relay access denied
```

Relay access denied

Web Application

Platform Overview

Discourse is an open-source discussion platform used for building and managing online communities. The platform organized conversations into topics, grouped by categories and tags, and supported real-time notifications, rich-text formatting, and link previews within the reading interface. Participation was supported both through the web interface and via email, with additional functionality including private messaging and polls. Community governance and operational functions were supported through a trust-level system, in which user privileges were incrementally adjusted based on observed account activity, along with built-in spam handling and moderation tools.



Discourse dashboard

Administrative functionality included a configurable dashboard, role-based permission structures, and support for single sign-on (SSO) and social login options. The platform's architecture supported extensibility through themes, plugins, and an exposed API, allowing for customization and integration with third-party services. Discourse instances could be deployed as self-hosted installations or through a cloud-hosted service, with data storage and configuration options varying based on the deployment method selected by the organization.

Information Gathering

The web application assessment began with active reconnaissance, which consisted of manually browsing links within the application while using an HTTP intercepting proxy. In doing so, an application map was created to conduct testing via a quantitative approach and to mark any broken or out-of-scope functionality. A combination of built-in scanning tools and plugins was used to discover information about the application's functionality and supporting infrastructure, including points of user input and the technology stack used to build the application. As the web application source code was available on GitHub (via https://github.com/discourse/discourse), emphasis was also placed on manual code review, including identification of the exact Discourse version in use, along with associated Ruby gem and front-end package dependencies. These were cross-referenced against public vulnerability databases and Discourse's own security advisories to check for known, unpatched issues.



Detected technologies

The platform employed a decoupled web architecture consisting of a Ruby on Rails application that exposed a REST API, while an Ember.js single-page application delivered the client-side experience. Data was persisted in PostgreSQL, with Redis used for caching and transient state, while background processing was handled by Sidekiq for various functions throughout the application. Near-real-time UI updates, such as new posts, were delivered via the MessageBus library. This design kept the interactive front end responsive while the Rails API enforced business logic and persistence concerns. With this information in mind, testing included direct interaction with the REST API independent of the Ember.js client to verify that authorization and business logic were enforced at the server layer. Attention was additionally given to constructs specific to the platform's architecture, including the trust-level system governing user privileges, the MessageBus channel, and Sidekiq-driven background jobs, along with enumeration of installed plugins and custom themes. The Discourse platform was then assessed for vulnerabilities within the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide (WSTG) and issues that could lead to a compromise of the infrastructure supporting it. No findings were identified within the web application at the time of testing.

Authentication Testing

Authentication testing examined Discourse's login workflows and session establishment. The application maintained state with a server-side session identified by the "_forum_session" cookie and, during interactive flows, a "_t" cookie. The observed login flow began with an HTTP GET request to "/session/csrf" while carrying an anonymous "_forum_session" and no Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) header. The server returned a token that was then supplied in the "X-Csrf-Token" header when subsequently posting credentials to "/session". In this XML HTTP Request (XHR) flow, the client submitted form-encoded fields including "login" (email or username), "password", an optional "second_factor_method", and the user's "timezone"; with valid credentials the server upgraded the session. A parallel HTML-only flow was also observed that sends an HTTP POST request to "/login", which accepted "username", "password", and a "redirect" target. Discourse used a "destination_url" cookie together with the "redirect" parameter to return the user to the requested resource after authentication.

Discourse supported several authentication methods, with the site administrator able to enable or restrict which methods were made available to users through the admin settings panel. These included traditional username and password-based login, email-based login utilizing a one-time authentication link (referred to as a "magic link"), Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) based single sign-on, Generic OAuth2 and Discourse ID, Discourse's proprietary single sign-on protocol allowing integration with an external identity provider. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) could also be enabled independently of the underlying login method selected. With respect to the email-based login flow, an HTTP GET request was observed to a unique, single-use endpoint in the format "/session/email-login/[token]", which, upon being browsed to, established an authenticated session without the submission of a password. Application programming interface (API) based authentication was also available for programmatic access using API keys or user API keys, separate from the interactive login flows described above.

Credential-Based Login

Credential-based login testing began with analysis of Discourse's source code. Password complexity requirements within Discourse were configurable by the site administrator, allowing for a required password length ranging from eight (8) to 500 characters. Additional configurable restrictions included a minimum number of unique characters, ranging from one (1) to ten (10), and an option to restrict the use of common passwords, which, when enabled, checked submitted passwords against a list of the ten thousand (10,000) most commonly used passwords. Rate limiting was identified as the primary defense mechanism protecting authentication endpoints, rather than a fixed account lockout threshold. Login attempts were governed by the "max_logins_per_ip_per_hour" and "max_logins_per_ip_per_minute" settings, which restricted the number of login requests permitted from a given IP address within the specified time windows. Rate limiting was similarly enforced on second-factor authentication attempts through the "rate_limit_second_factor!" method.



Rate limiting warning

Schellman validated these controls by testing the "/login" and "/session" endpoints with request spraying to confirm rate limiting behavior, and verified session rotation and CSRF enforcement. Targeted injection testing covered SQL injection (SQLi) and redirect tampering, including encoded variants, scheme prefixes, and userinfo /host confusion along with testing of the "destination_url" cookie value. In each case, the application returned a same-origin path and error responses, with no evidence of input-driven execution.

Multi-Factor Authentication Testing

Multi-factor authentication (MFA) within Discourse utilized a time-based, six-digit numeric code that rotated on a thirty (30) second interval. Submitted codes were validated by the server, and, in conjunction with the previously noted rate limiting of six (6) attempts per minute, brute-force enumeration of valid codes was determined to be impractical within a reasonable timeframe. MFA verification was processed through the same request flow used during standard login, with the "second_factor_method" and associated code submitted alongside the "login" and "password" fields to the "/session" endpoint.



MFA code re-use response

Discourse ID

Discourse ID is Discourse's own hosted single sign-on service, operating from the centralized "id.discourse.com" domain. Accounts are registered directly with Discourse ID rather than with an individual tenant, and once a tenant enables the integration, it is surfaced as a login option on that tenant's login screen, allowing a single Discourse ID account to authenticate across any participating tenant. The flow follows a standard OAuth2 authorization code grant: the tenant redirects the user to "id.discourse.com/oauth/authorize" with its registered "client_id", "redirect_uri", "response_type=code", "scope", and a "state" value; "id.discourse.com" authenticates the user via its own session and, upon approval, redirects back to the tenant's "/auth/discourse_id/callback" endpoint with an authorization "code" and the original "state". The tenant validates the returned "state", exchanges the "code" server-side for the user's identity, establishes a local authenticated session via the "_forum_session" cookie, and returns the user to their original destination. Session cookies were observed to rotate at the point of redirect to the identity provider, consistent with mitigation against session fixation.

Testing of this flow included manipulation of the "redirect_uri", "state", and "code" parameters, along with general redirect and injection testing against the SSO process, with no findings identified. The Discourse ID application also allows users to configure their profile image, offering a basic default profile image, a Gravatar-based image, and a custom uploaded image. All three options were tested, including content-type validation and rendering behavior for the custom upload and Gravatar functionality, with no vulnerabilities identified.



Discourse ID profile page with uploader

As a centralized identity provider shared across all participating tenants, Discourse ID maintains a single, large directory of registered users. Testing found that username enumeration was possible against this shared user base via authenticated requests to "/u/{username}", with the application returning distinguishable responses depending on account state — indicating the username was private or did not exist, indicating the profile was hidden, or, for valid non-hidden accounts, returning a profile page with user statistics. This differential behavior allows systematic enumeration of valid usernames within the "id.discourse.com" subdomain, and given its role as a shared identity provider across tenants, represents a broader information disclosure risk than username enumeration would typically pose on an isolated, single-tenant instance.



Hidden account profile for a valid username



Non-existent username

SAML-based Authentication Mechanism

In addition to credential-based local web accounts, the platform allowed administrators to configure authentication through a third-party Identity Provider (IdP) using Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), which was implemented by way of a plugin. Because this workflow depended on a signed XML document being relayed from the IdP to the application through the user's browser, testing concentrated on bypassing authentication through direct modification and signature manipulation of the "SAMLResponse".

Signatures within the "SAMLResponse" were first stripped to determine whether the underlying XML processor required their presence. The server rejected the modified assertion and returned the message "Sorry, there was an error while trying to authorize your account with saml. Please try again.", confirming that signature existence was enforced. Certificate forgery was attempted next by extracting the embedded certificate and re-signing the assertion with an attacker-controlled key, which produced the same error observed during the signature exclusion attempt. Building on these results, eight (8) XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) attack cases were executed against the "SAMLResponse" to identify whether unsigned data could take precedence over signed data within the validation logic. Each case returned the same rejection, and no findings resulted from this effort.



Response as a result of invalid SAML submission

Focus then shifted to traditional XML document attacks, including XML External Entity (XXE) and Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations (XSLT) injection. By abusing these XML properties, attempts were made to coerce back-end processing into issuing outbound requests to Schellman-controlled servers. No such callbacks were observed. No vulnerabilities were identified within the SAML authentication feature.

Sign-Up Process Testing

The sign-up process followed the same CSRF protection pattern as the login page. The client first sent an HTTP GET request to "/session/csrf" with an anonymous "_forum_session", then submitted an HTTP POST request to "/u" via XHR with "X-Csrf-Token" and form fields for "email", "username", "password", "password_confirmation", "server_challenge", and "timezone". On success, the flow sent an HTTP POST request with credentials to "/login" with a redirect to "/u/account-created". In addition to the standard sign-up flow, users could also be granted access to the application through an invite link, generated by an existing privileged user or administrator, that contained a thirty-two (32) character code appended to the "/invites/" endpoint. Invite links could be configured with a set expiration duration or a maximum number of allowed redemptions, after which the link would no longer be valid.



Sign up Page

Upon account creation, host header injection was performed against the activation links to determine whether or not they could be changed to a Schellman-controlled domain using headers such as "X-Forwarded-Host" and "Forwarded". As a result, hostnames supplied in the emailed activation URL were not altered. Open redirect upon login was checked against the "redirect" parameter with various payload encodings of "https://" and "//" pointed toward Schellman-controlled domains; these tests consistently produced an HTTP "302 Temporary Redirect", followed by a "Location" header directing to the site homepage rather than the specified host. For activation, replay checks included completing activation with HTTP PUT requests to "/u/activate-account/.json" followed by immediate replay of the same token; tests returned an HTTP "422 Unprocessable Entity" response with a message stating the link was no longer valid. Furthermore, injection tests against the "password_confirmation" field, as well as omitting or randomizing the "challenge" parameter, produced an HTTP "403 Forbidden" response with an "invalid_access" error message.

Password Reset and Forgot Email Functionalities

Password reset and forgotten email functionality was assessed as part of authentication testing. As a single "login" field accepted either a username or email address, and a magic link could be sent to the associated email address for either identifier, the process did not specifically mention a forgotten-email lookup but operated in a functionally similar manner. Rate limiting was employed as the primary control on this functionality, with password reset requests restricted to six (6) per hour and three (3) per minute, per IP address.

Password reset email

The password reset flow began with an HTTP POST request to "/session/forgot_password". The server returned a uniform success message regardless of whether the submitted value corresponded to an existing account, and, if applicable, emailed a reset token URL to the associated address. When visited, the reset link validated the token at "/u/confirm-email-token/.json" and presented a new-password form. Schellman verified that submitting a new password invalidated the associated token, rotated the session, and enforced the site's configured password policy. Reset tokens were observed to be thirty-two (32) hexadecimal codes with sufficiently high entropy, and the reset workflow did not disclose whether a submitted login value corresponded to an existing account. Host header injection was also tested against the reset endpoint using "Host", "X-Forwarded-Host", and "Forwarded" header variations; these attempts consistently returned HTTP "404 Not Found" responses and did not influence the host used in reset links or subsequent redirects.

Authorization Testing

Authorization testing focused on evaluating access control mechanisms to identify potential vulnerabilities that could allow unauthorized access to sensitive functionality or data. The Discourse platform implemented role-based access controls (RBAC) across its functionality, with granular permissions configurable by administrators. In addition to the administrator and standard user roles, the platform supported moderator roles and a trust-level system, each associated with a distinct set of capabilities. Access to topics was public and accessible to anonymous, unauthenticated viewers by default, unless a topic was created as a Personal Message by a standard user, or a category was otherwise restricted by an administrator or moderator. Each role was associated with a specific set of capabilities, enforced both client-side via UI restrictions and server-side through API validation.

Administrators were additionally granted the ability to impersonate users within their Discourse tenant, initiating a session as the targeted user for a duration of fifteen (15) minutes. Once this window elapsed, the impersonated session expired, reverting control back to the administrator's original session.



User specific access to posts

Role Validation and Privilege Escalation Testing

Testing was conducted from unauthenticated, authenticated standard user, and administrator perspectives. After navigating the functions available to administrators and moderators and capturing the corresponding requests with an HTTP intercepting proxy, the standard user account and an unauthenticated visitor were used to replay each request. In each case, API calls invoked by the UI were properly restricted to the capabilities and permissions associated with the respective roles. Attempts to access resources within the "/admin/" directories from a standard user session resulted in HTTP "404 Not Found" responses. Testing of additional functionality, including responding to flagged posts, performing IP address lookups, bulk inviting users, modifying user profiles, and removing user suspensions, among other actions, resulted in HTTP "403 Forbidden" responses, with messages such as "You are not permitted to view the requested resource" and "You need to be logged in to do that" observed in response bodies. Enforcement of these restrictions was consistent both at the UI layer, where restricted or hidden topics and administrative functions were not rendered to unauthorized roles, and at the API layer, where direct requests to restricted endpoints were independently rejected. No findings were identified during assessment of RBAC enforcement.

Tenant-to-Tenant Authorization Testing

Tenant-based access controls were validated to ensure that users could not access or modify data belonging to other Discourse cloud accounts. Testing was conducted between the RedSchell and BlueSchell tenants, each of which was observed to maintain its own isolated set of data, including topics, users, and administrative configurations, with no overlap identified between the two environments regardless of the role being tested. Attempts to use Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) techniques to enumerate or access resources belonging to the other tenant, such as logs and user details, were blocked. Schellman observed a limited number of parameters presenting direct object references that were suitable candidates for alteration in attempts to access or modify another tenant's data. Various attempts to use invite links belonging to another tenant, or to post topics and replies within another tenant's environment, were unsuccessful and returned HTTP "404 Not Found" responses.



Authorization testing request

Injection Testing

The API employed parameterized queries to constrain database inputs, and user-generated content was passed through an allow-listed HTML sanitization pipeline on both the server and client. A default Content-Security-Policy (CSP) provided additional defenses against JavaScript injection. With the web application's architecture in mind, custom scanning configurations were deployed against identified routes while manual testing was conducted concurrently. Testing covered various injection types, including Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), XXE, Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), SQLi, SMTP header injection, and Carriage Return Line Feed (CRLF) injection.



Injection testing example

Schellman tested for potential XSS vulnerabilities when rendering user-generated content in features such as topic creation and post responses. HTML injection payloads were used to identify areas of the application where formatting changes would be reflected in the rendered output. In areas where such formatting changes were observed, submitted payloads containing malicious script content were consistently stripped prior to rendering. In areas where the application did not render HTML formatting changes, injected payloads were reflected as plain text rather than being interpreted or executed. SSTI testing was performed against areas of the application capable of rendering user-supplied templates or notes, including submission of traditional test payloads such as "{7*7}". In each case, the enclosing curly brackets were stripped from the input, resulting in the literal value "77" being rendered rather than the evaluated result of the expression. Payloads specific to the Ruby on Rails templating engine were also attempted against these same areas of functionality. External callback testing utilizing a private Burp Collaborator instance was conducted to identify potential out-of-band injection vectors. No successful callbacks were observed, and no findings were identified as a result of injection testing performed during this assessment.

API testing

Discourse provided Schellman with their API documentation, available at https://docs.discourse.org. The Discourse API specification file was used to facilitate automated scanning of the API for injection vulnerabilities, authentication weaknesses, header-based issues, and other categories of testing. In addition to automated scanning, manual testing of the API was conducted throughout the course of the web application assessment, using an HTTP intercepting proxy to capture, review, and modify requests sent to and responses received from the API during standard application use. No vulnerabilities were identified during assessment of the API.

Feature-Specific Testing

Features with unique security challenges were further reviewed in search of vulnerabilities not applicable to the broader platform. Each targeted area was evaluated against known attack vectors and abuse scenarios, leveraging both automated tools and manual exploration to validate protections. Below is a breakdown of notable observations across features with specific use cases.

File Upload Testing

File uploads were used across various platform features, such as site branding (logos and favicons), custom emojis, and user avatars. Administrators were able to configure which file types were permitted for upload through the site settings. The upload process operated using a presigned Amazon S3 workflow across the tested features, beginning with an HTTP POST request to "/uploads/generate-presigned-put", which included parameters such as "file_name", "file_size", "type", and a SHA-1 checksum of the file contents. The server responded with a presigned S3 URL, a set of signed headers, including "x-amz-acl", "x-amz-meta-sha1-checksum", and "x-amz-tagging", and a unique identifier for the upload. The file was then uploaded directly to the returned presigned S3 URL via an HTTP PUT request, with the presigned URL scoped to a ten (10) minute expiration window.



Various uploader test points

Schellman attempted to bypass accepted file upload restrictions by altering the "Content-Type", file extension, and file content across several tested file types, including SVG, PDF, and XML formats, in an attempt to identify a viable injection or execution path. Files containing embedded injection payloads were successfully uploaded to the S3 bucket in each of these formats; however, upon rendering or downloading the associated file, the injected payload content was consistently stripped, regardless of file type. Downloaded files were retrieved using a signed key referencing the associated S3 object, with the payload content removed prior to being served. No findings were identified with respect to the file upload functionality.



S3 bucket utilization across the application

[Continued on next page]

SSRF Testing

SSRF testing was conducted against areas of the application that issued outbound calls to external resources, such as URL previews, image proxying, and webhook or inbox functionality. Initial testing involved directing these features toward Schellman-controlled Burp Collaborator instances to determine whether outbound connectivity could be established and observed from the application. Following this, testing included direct manipulation of user-supplied URLs and links, along with well-known SSRF bypass techniques, including alternate IP representations (e.g., decimal, octal, and hexadecimal encodings), IPv6 equivalents of loopback and internal addresses, DNS rebinding attempts, and open redirect chaining, in an effort to have the application issue requests to internal or restricted resources on the application's behalf.



Example of SSRF testing via Intruder

To better understand how these outbound requests were validated and constrained, source code review was conducted against the application's URL resolution logic within the "final_destination.rb" file. This component served as the primary gatekeeper for outbound HTTP(S) requests made by the application's various fetchers, including link preview generation, inbox and webhook processing. This was responsible for resolving a given URL to its final destination prior to the request being issued. Review of this logic identified several layered controls. Resolved IP addresses were checked against known private, loopback, link-local, and reserved ranges (e.g., "10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16"), with requests targeting these ranges rejected prior to being issued. Hostnames were resolved and re-validated against these same private and reserved IP checks following resolution, mitigating DNS rebinding attacks in which a hostname could resolve to a public IP address at validation time but an internal IP address at request time. The application followed HTTP redirects up to a defined maximum, with each redirect destination independently re-validated against the same IP and scheme restrictions rather than being trusted based on the initial request's validation. Additionally, only the "http" and "https" schemes were permitted, preventing the use of alternate schemes, such as "file://", "gopher://", or "dict://", as a means of reaching internal services or the local filesystem.

Based on this understanding of the application's underlying validation logic, targeted testing was performed against common internal service ports, including Redis, PostgreSQL, and standard HTTP/HTTPS ports, in an attempt to bypass these controls. Of the payloads tested, three (3) were observed to be processed by the application rather than rejected outright at the validation layer; however, in each case, the resulting response indicated that the requested Discourse-hosted resource could not be found, rather than returning data indicative of a successful internal request or service interaction. No findings were identified as a result of this testing, and no evidence was identified to suggest that these payloads resulted in a successful SSRF condition or disclosed information regarding internal infrastructure.

AI/LLM-Powered Features

Focus was placed on artificial intelligence (AI) features within the Discourse AI plugin, including the AI Helper functions for proofreading, generating suggestions, and providing translations, as well as topic summarization capabilities. Testing was conducted using the default CDCK-hosted models with standard configuration values to maintain consistency across scenarios, and extended to the AI Chatbot and its preset prompts configured within the administrator settings, topic title suggestions, custom prompts, sentiment analysis reporting, and Discobot. In addition to the default hosted models, the platform supported the configuration of API keys for third-party AI providers, including Google Gemini and OpenAI ChatGPT, allowing administrators to integrate alternate models for use within these features.



Chatbot prompt injection and LLM output assessment

Various prompt injection and jailbreak techniques were attempted across these surfaces, primarily via forum post summaries and chatbot interactions, to assess whether malicious input could manipulate AI behavior, result in the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information, or be leveraged to abuse the AI's ability to browse external web content. Testing further evaluated the platform for excessive agency, improper output handling, and unwanted data disclosure, assessing whether these AI-driven features could be manipulated into performing unauthorized actions or generating output that introduced vulnerabilities, such as XSS or SQL injection, when rendered to users.

The primary model in use was a pre-configured, open-source model integrated via CDCK/MoM, which identified itself an Alibaba Qwen model. This model was researched for publicly known vulnerabilities and exploits, which were subsequently tested against the implementation without success, as prompts were processed and rendered strictly via Markdown. An additional technique involving malformed Markdown intended to trigger external calls was also attempted. No findings were identified in the AI/LLM functionality.



Markdown external resource testing via suggestion custom prompt

Discourse Plugins

A sample of eight (8) Discourse core plugins were examined during the window of the engagement. This includes the SAML plugin and Discourse ID covered in the Authentication section of the Web Application Attack Path Narrative.

Ads Plugin

The Ads plugin provided the ability to display advertisements to specified users throughout the site. Because many of its features depended on a linked third-party advertising account, testing concentrated on the "House Ads" functionality, which operated entirely within the application. Plugin settings governed which users were shown advertisements and where those advertisements were rendered. Administrative privileges were required to reach this configuration, so a low-privileged account was first leveraged in an attempt to update an existing advertisement; the request was rejected and the modification did not succeed. Despite the administrative requirement, injection payloads were submitted against the same functionality to evaluate the risk posed by an insider threat. These attempts revealed a restrictively configured Content Security Policy (CSP) that permitted script execution only from approved sources and required a matching nonce. To determine whether the policy could be subverted, the nonce value was copied from the page and appended as a property within the payload, with the intent of having the script inherit a valid nonce during a dynamic load originating from the same page. The browser did not honor the injected value, and script execution was not achieved.



Example error thrown from the CSP blocking JavaScript Execution

Assign Plugin

The Assign plugin allowed users to be assigned to a topic and exposed several settings for customizing that behavior, such as reassigning the previous user when a topic was reopened. Assignment rights were restricted to a designated group defined within the plugin configuration. A low-privileged account outside of that group was used to verify enforcement, and the application denied the attempted changes as expected. While reviewing the assignment workflow, it was observed that the "system" user could neither be queried nor selected through the interface. By intercepting the request and substituting the "system" account into the assignment parameter, the assignment was accepted by the application. The resulting condition presented no demonstrable security impact, and no findings were identified during this phase of testing.



System user assigned to topic

Data Explorer

The data explorer plugin is a PostgreSQL powered query interface allowing admins to interact with the underlying databases directly. The plugin provides an AI assistant for support with generating queries. A focus was placed on interacting directly with the underlying system utilizing the query system. PostgreSQL contains the builtin "FROM PROGRAM" function that is available to super users only. Attempted queries to create files and read them back using this functionality was unsuccessful indicating that underlying user or database permissions were properly provisioned. PostgreSQL also has the optional procedural language extension to run system level commands. This was attempted as well, but failed indicating the extension was either not available, or not permissible to use by the user. Finally, the AI assistant was instructed to create a query to interact with the underlying system as well. However, this attempts resulted in the error "AI did not return a valid SQL query. Please try again or write the query manually". Dependent on the instructions, delays were observed when receiving this error suggesting the AI was responding to the malicious instructions in some manner.



Example response from the AI assistant when instructed to create a query to access the underlying file system

Subdomain Manager

The Subdomain Manager is a plugin operating within Discourse ID that allows authenticated users to claim a free subdomain for use with a self-hosted Discourse instance, with DNS records provisioned automatically via AWS Route53. The functionality is accessed by an authenticated user at a URL following the pattern "https://id.discourse.com/u/{username}/subdomain", and supports the Discourse installer workflow, in which a user claims a subdomain, generates a time-limited numeric verification code, and supplies that code along with their server's IP address to the unauthenticated "/subdomain-manager/verify" endpoint to complete DNS provisioning.



Subdomain Manager dashboard

Testing was conducted against the authenticated endpoints governing subdomain claiming and status, as well as the unauthenticated verification endpoint used by the installer. Subdomain selection was tested against the platform's reserved and blocklisted subdomain list, confirming that reserved values could not be claimed, and that attempting to claim an already-registered subdomain was consistently rejected. Parameters across each endpoint, including "subdomain", "code", and "ip_address", were assessed for injection vectors and information disclosure through error messages or response bodies; no findings were identified.



Subdomain selection testing

The verification code mechanism, consisting of a randomly generated six (6) digit numeric code, was assessed against the rate limiting controls enforced on the verification endpoint. Given the code's expiration window and the applicable rate limits, the number of guessable combinations achievable within the code's validity period was limited, and testing confirmed these controls were enforced with no identified means of bypass. No findings were identified during assessment of the Subdomain Manager functionality as a whole.

Zendesk Integration

The Discourse platform enabled the creation of Zendesk support tickets directly from forum topics. Once an administrator configured a valid Zendesk API key and associated account credentials, a "Create Zendesk Ticket" button appeared beneath the topic view. Selecting this button issued a POST request to the "/zendesk-plugin/issues" endpoint, which included the "topic_id" parameter to indicate which Discourse topic should be linked to the newly created ticket. Testing of this functionality included manipulation of the "topic_id" parameter and other request values in an attempt to create tickets referencing unauthorized or out-of-scope topics. No vulnerabilities were identified during the assessment of this integration.



Zendesk request

Static Analysis of Plugins

Given the limited engagement window, the public Discourse GitHub repository was cloned locally to facilitate static code analysis through a combination of automated tooling, (AI) analysis, and manual verification. Semgrep, an open-source static analysis tool, was executed against the web application codebase with focus placed on the deployed plugins. Each result returned by the scan was manually reviewed and subsequently determined to be a false positive. For example, an instance of disabled XSS escaping was flagged within the application; however, follow-up manual testing did not identify a location where the associated output was rendered as executable JavaScript. To supplement the manual review of the potential issues, AI-assisted analysis was performed against both the Semgrep output and the plugin source code. Neither analysis yielded verifiable findings.

Risk Ratings

How Risk is Calculated

Schellman assigns a risk rating to each vulnerability based on the likelihood and impact of the exploit. The risk ratings are based on the guidelines published in NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1. The table below provides an overview of how the overall risk rating is determined and a definition of each category can be found below.

	Low Impact	Moderate Impact	High Impact
High Likelihood	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH
Moderate Likelihood	LOW	MODERATE	MODERATE
Low Likelihood	LOW	LOW	LOW

Risk mapping matrix

Likelihood and Impact Explained

Likelihood - The probability the vulnerability can be exploited, considering the attacker's skill level and access.

- High – The attacker requires no specific motivation or special skills to exploit, and the vulnerability is easily accessible. Examples include well understood vulnerabilities and those with functional or proof-of-concepts available.
- Moderate – The attacker requires some motivation and experience; additionally, the vulnerability may be restricted by controls in the environment. Examples include vulnerabilities requiring specific and non-default settings enabled and those in environments that are accessible with two-factor authentication.
- Low – The attacker requires specialized skills and is highly motivated; additionally, the vulnerability requires enhanced levels of access to exploit. Vulnerabilities that are theoretically possible, or likely only exploitable by Nation States are examples.

Impact – The potential harm done to the organization based on the vulnerability.

- High – Exploitation of the finding results in a serious compromise to the system and will likely disrupt business operations, potentially for an extended period. Examples include remote code execution resulting in administrative access on the host and SQL injections disclosing extensive amounts of sensitive data.
- Moderate – Exploitation of the finding results in significant compromise to the system and may disrupt business operations in the short term. Examples include local privilege escalation attacks and incubated vulnerabilities that require concatenation to fully exploit.
- Low – Exploitation of the finding results in no additional access to the system and would not cause a disruption to business operations. Examples include default SNMP community strings and many SSL vulnerabilities.

Issues Identified

No issues were found during this assessment.

Appendix A: Post Engagement Cleanup

Exposed Credentials

No credentials were exposed as a result of this assessment.

Accounts to be Removed

No accounts require removal as a result of this assessment.

Artifacts to be Removed

No artifacts require removal as a result of this assessment.

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